Earendel

Apr 11 2010, 09:36 AM

http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/

Analysis: Lebanon: Conflict widens to Syria – Jonathan Spyer

Any future strike at Hizbullah that does not take into account its status as a client of Syria, is unlikely to land a decisive blow.

In the last week, senior Israeli policymakers made statements of an uncharacteristically bellicose nature regarding Syria.

It is unlikely that these statements were made because of sudden random irritation toward Israel's hostile northeastern neighbor. Rather, the statements probably constituted part of a message of deterrence to Damascus.

The need to project deterrence itself derives from a series of significant changes currently under way on the ground in Lebanon - reflecting Syria's ever tighter alignment with Hizbullah and the pro-Iranian regional bloc of which it is a part.

These changes take place against the backdrop of awareness that the tactics likely to be adopted by Israel in a future war with Hizbullah carry with them the very real possibility that Syria could, on one level or another, be drawn in.

Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon, meeting with Michael Williams, the UN special coordinator for Lebanon earlier this week, expressed his concern that Hizbullah fighters have been training on surface-to-surface missile systems in Syria.


Then, on Tuesday, Defense Minister Ehud Barak noted in a speech that if Israel was forced to fight Syria, "we won't fear and we'll defeat them." Why the sudden ministerial loquaciousness?

It may with some justification be asserted that to assume any coordination behind the statements of Israeli ministers is to betray a touching naivete. All the same, the near-simultaneous ministerial recollection of the Syrian threat should be considered in conjunction with the following facts:

Hizbullah has in the last weeks deployed advanced Syrian-made surface-to-surface M-600 missiles on the territory of Lebanon. The missiles, which according to Jane's Defence Weekly are copies of the Iranian Fateh-110 system, have a range of 250 kilometers and carry a 500-kg warhead.

They bring the entirety of central Israel within Hizbullah's range. The missiles are precision-guided, meaning that in the event of renewed conflict, Hizbullah would be able to use them to target military facilities or heavily populated areas.

According to Jane's, the deployment of the M-600s adds to concerns already expressed by Israel at Syrian supplying of the (relatively unsophisticated) SA-2 air defense system and the SS-N-26 surface-to-sea missile to Hizbullah.

Syria's undaunted and increased support for Hizbullah appears to reflect a clear strategic turn taken by Damascus. Lebanese analyst Tony Badran this week drew attention to a recent and relevant report in the Qatari daily al-Watan which quoted Syrian sources who claimed that "a strategic decision has been taken not to allow Israel to defeat the resistance movements."

Such statements, if genuine, indicate that the Syrian regime is aware of the potential price to be paid for its current orientation, but feels that the risk is worth taking.

The Syrians have not, according to available evidence, yet passed the point of no return - which, as Badran notes, would be the provision of sophisticated anti-aircraft systems to Hizbullah. The SA-2, if deployed, could constitute a danger to IAF helicopters, but not aircraft.

Israel has made clear that the deployment of systems capable of threatening Israeli aircraft by Hizbullah would constitute a casus belli.

But beyond the specific issue of weapons systems, the logic of confrontation in Lebanon suggests that Syria may find it hard to avoid direct engagement in a future Israel-Hizbullah clash.

Since 2006, Lebanon's eastern border with Syria has formed the key conduit for weapons supplies to Hizbullah. And Hizbullah is reported to have relocated its main military infrastructure north of the Litani River, in the Bekaa Valley, in areas close to the Syrian border.

Which suggests that if Israel wants in a future conflict to strike a real blow against Hizbullah, this implies an Israeli ground incursion into the Bekaa.

Should such an incursion take place, the Syrians would be intimately involved in supplying Hizbullah just across the border, and the possibility of Syrian casualties at Israeli hands would become very real.

It is again worth remembering that on August 4, 2006, 34 Syrians were killed when the IAF bombed a packing house on the Syrian side of the border thought to contain weapons for Hizbullah. The Syrians did not respond at that time.

But an Israeli incursion into the Bekaa would logically raise the question of either the Syrians ceasing their real-time supplying of Hizbullah (very unlikely), or Israel acting to prevent this.

Of course, the point of deterrence is to deter. The ominous statements from Israeli officials are not meant to signal an imminent war. Rather, they are intended to convey to the Syrians that they should not think their alliance with Hizbullah is cost free, and that they would be advised to adhere to red lines.

The developing logic of the situation in Lebanon is nevertheless widening the circle of future conflict.

The bottom line is that any future strike at Hizbullah that does not take into account its status as a client of Iran and Syria, is unlikely to be able to land the kind of decisive blow to the organization which alone would justify such a strike.


Israel and Hizbollah have exchanged threats in recent weeks, warning of the dire consequences of a new war between Lebanon and Israel. This has detracted somewhat from the possibility of an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, amid growing signs that the international community, and the US in particular, has no decisive leverage to discourage Tehran from building a nuclear device.

No one doubts that Israel has a contingency plan, and the will, to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. However, the political costs of such action may be so prohibitive, and the chances of military success so uncertain, that the probability of Israel going through with it may be far lower than Israeli officials, keen to display their brinkmanship, let on.

The motive for an attack is rising by the day. Iran has not altered course, and evidently sees no reason to. The five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany met recently to discuss imposing new sanctions, but China, with its expanding economic ties with Tehran, remained unresponsive. Even there the nature of the sanctions is instructive: they are designed to target regime power centers, such as the Revolutionary Guards – hardly enough to halt the nuclear program.

Gone from the mix is the use of armed force against Iran. The international community’s sole weapon is diplomacy, and if that fails, sanctions. Complicating matters is the domestic turmoil in Iran, which has obstructed progress in two ways: it has validated a view among Iran’s interlocutors that internal Iranian divisions make conclusive talks with the regime difficult, which Tehran has exploited to buy time; and it has discouraged the US in particular from resorting to war, since this might unite Iranians and strengthen the regime, undermining prospects that its legitimacy crisis will erode its authority.

All this is alarming enough for Israel that it is surely accelerating its preparations for war. Yet playing against this outcome are several factors, most of them touching on vital US interests. For the Israelis, the optimal situation would be one where Washington undertakes a military operation itself. Given the Americans’ deployment near Iran, their naval and guided missile capability, and that their contingency plans include a much wider target list than just nuclear facilities, the Israelis have, sensibly, sought to persuade the US of the necessity of an attack, even as they have asked for Washington’s green light to do so themselves.

It is almost impossible to imagine that the Israelis would take action without prior American approval. To grant that approval, however, the Obama administration and US commanders would have to be prepared to absorb the consequences for their own regional priorities. Iran could not only be expected to retaliate against Israel directly, using its long-range missiles, but also indirectly through Hizbollah, firing from Lebanon. That, in turn, could provoke a regional conflagration that draws in Syria, possibly also Hamas, with a very good chance that it would all leave the administration’s Middle Eastern peace strategy in tatters.

More significantly, Iran would unquestionably retaliate against the US and maybe its friends in the Gulf. We should not over-estimate Tehran’s capacity to spawn an uprising in Iraq, particularly since the Americans are withdrawing. However, other American allies, such as Saudi Arabia, but also Bahrain, and even the UAE and Qatar, could find themselves in the line of fire. The Iranian rejoinder need not be subtle, or even entirely successful, to create a major headache for the Obama administration, since controlling the consequences would be tricky. Chaos benefits the regime in Tehran more than it does the US, the defender of the region’s status quo and pillar of its security order.

Then there is Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran has plenty of latitude to make life difficult for Nato in Afghanistan, and it doesn’t take much imagination to foresee how an American-authorized Israeli attack against Iran would play out in Pakistan, given the mood there. The combination of both factors could cripple Mr Obama’s Afghan strategy, which is already hampered by delays in troop deployments and the reticence of American allies.

Iran has the scope to respond in a multifaceted way to any American or Israeli military operation – from Lebanon, possibly from Gaza as well, in the Gulf and in Afghanistan – all areas away from Iranian territory. Neither the US nor Israel can do the same, which will, in turn, make them both more reliant on a rapid escalation of force. In other words, Iran can play on the multiple political contradictions in the region, while the US and Israel, by responding through the only means readily at their disposal, military power, would only heighten these contradictions.

All this still does not mean that Israel will refrain from attacking Iran. But with the potential repercussions so risky and the international community cold towards any sort of military operation, we may steadily be moving closer to an American, and international, Plan B: the acceptance of Iranian nuclear weapons, then containment through nuclear deterrence and other multilateral means. That said, so clear a statement of purpose has yet to be publicly expressed in Washington, and the bureaucracy has not reached a consensus.

Despite Israel’s conviction that an Iranian nuclear weapon represents a mortal threat, this view may have to be mitigated. Those entitled to fear Iran most are the Gulf states, who have no nuclear deterrent. Under present circumstances, an Israeli assault would open a Pandora’s box with aftershocks that the Obama administration is deeply reluctant to face. And when Washington is helpless, Israel has little room to dissent.